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Conversation is a significant notion 
in the work of Charles S. Peirce: 
from his view of the history of phi-
losophy as the conversations of the 
philosophers to his account of the 
sign as necessarily addressed, from 
his understanding of hypothesis as 
question to his construal of science 
as taking place in a community of 
inquiry, there are always (mini-
mally) two voices—two sources 
of ideas—engaged attentively 
with each other and committed 
to discovering the consequences 
of their exchange. There is much 
disagreement, and much doubt, in 
such a process, and—as for Peirce’s 
emblematic two tramps who leave 
messages for each other along the 
road of inquiry—much building 
on the work of predecessors. In his 
own exchanges with colleagues and 
friends, Peirce was a fine reviewer 
of the work of other people, and 
the evidence shows that his discus-
sions of their work—often in richly 
reflective letters—mattered deeply 
to his correspondents. Alongside 
these facts, we might set this other: 
much of his writing takes the form 
of series of lecture series or papers; 
though he wished to produce a sys-
tem in the form of a philosophical 
treatise, it is clear that these more 
local modes with their invitation 
to immediate uptake suited him 
better. Through them, he had the 
greatest impact during his life, and, 
while it is standard practice now 
to consult the mass of manuscript 
writings for buried treasures, it is 
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and discussions of his work by 
ours (Joseph Margolis and Richard 
Rorty). The compare-and-contrast 
method enables the authors to 
draw on their shared formidable 
knowledge of Peirce’s writings, 
illuminating the issues with an 
admirable combination of textual 
precision and transversal under-
standing. Two painstaking chap-
ters by Housman, on the “dynamic 
object” and the beginning of inter-
pretation, take us to the heart of the 
difficulties in assessing the relation 
between Peirce’s metaphysics and 
his semiotic: no reader of Peirce 
can avoid this matter and, while 
these topics have been discussed 
frequently, their juxtaposition 
with the debates regarding the his-
tory of Pragmatism is particularly 
revealing. The end of the book 
consists of an eloquent case, made 
by Anderson, for not bracketing 
out Peirce’s theism, leading to a 
final chapter staging a response 
from Peirce to fundamentalism. 
This is a pragmatic use of Peirce, 
making a pair with Anderson’s 
account of Peirce’s objections to 
Pearson’s social utilitarian views 
of science. Both chapters have a 
strongly polemical undercurrent; 
they are addressed firmly to the 
public forum, and both rest on 
the philosophical work done in the 
other chapters to demonstrate how 
what I call the Peircean thematic 
(mentioned earlier) helps to cut 
through the impasses of contem-
porary social debate.
they that show how Peirce was in 
constant dialogue with himself. 
As Manley Thompson demon-
strated many years ago,1 Peirce’s 
habit was to explore in one series 
of papers or lectures a problem 
thrown up in the previous one. 
Even in silent solitary medita-
tion, he writes, one’s thoughts are 
addressed to one’s self of the next 
instant. It is the pervasive theme of 
conversation along with this habit 
of  dialogue that make not only the 
title, but the  conception, of this 
book so felicitous.
It consists of twelve chapters, 
each the upshot of conversations 
between the two principal authors 
or between one of them with other 
colleagues. Divided into three 
parts—Conversations I on the 
metaphysics, Conversations II on 
the epistemology, and Conversations 
III on Peirce and religion—the 
book is remarkable for overcom-
ing its multiple occasions in a 
cable of interwoven threads: clo-
sure vs. openness, the infinitely 
long run, the relations of “chance, 
love, and logic,” and continuity 
are the Peircean themes par excel-
lence whose bearing on standard 
philosophical topics is  continually 
demonstrated.
The most satisfying chapters 
are those examining conversa-
tions between Peirce and other 
 philosophers—from the past 
(Berkeley), with his  contemporaries 
(Josiah Royce, John Dewey, 
William James, and Karl Pearson), 
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to be told about it—the truth—[is] 
equally fixed and whole” (22). As 
against this, Dewey takes an exper-
imentalist position in which real-
ity is the product of a transactional 
account of experience, arguing that 
“the empiricist’s epistemological 
concern about whether an expe-
riencer can reach some external 
world is unnecessary because it is in 
experience that we do find nature” 
(62–63). Thus, the human history 
of inquiry is in a relation of recipro-
cal constraint with the natural his-
tory of the world. But Dewey, who 
inclined more towards a historicist 
understanding of the outcomes of 
science than did Peirce, was also 
inclined to proclaim the “disinter-
est” of pragmatism in ontology and 
metaphysics (36). It is this aspect of 
Dewey’s thought that provides the 
central plank of Richard Rorty’s 
repudiation of Peirce. But where, 
for Rorty, the “social conversation is 
the only source of constraint on . . . 
further conversation” (69), Dewey 
“argued minimally for something 
more” (64), since not to do so would 
involve a return to nominalism. 
Hence, Dewey “never relinquished 
his belief that inquirers were con-
strained by the real” (60), and his 
two central affinities with Peircean 
realism were “his belief in the real-
ity of habits and in the reality of 
possibility” (34).
Were we to set aside the ques-
tion of the real, we would be left 
with an outright constructivism 
such as our authors find in Joseph 
The conversations with other 
philosophers serve to set up the 
terms in which the discussions 
of the later chapters are pursued. 
Thus, Peirce’s review of Fraser’s 
edition of Berkeley identifies the 
crucial contrast between realism 
and nominalism, the latter being 
the view that reality consists exclu-
sively of singulars, that it is inde-
pendent of mind and external to 
it. This is the view presupposed in 
what has been called the so-called 
gap between representation and the 
real, a view against which Peirce 
argued throughout his work. 
Peirce sets out from here on a quest 
to define an account of representa-
tion in which the knowing of an 
object and the object of knowledge 
are continuous, though not assimi-
lable, with one another. This will 
be a nonidealist realism that can 
include singular existents alongside 
the postulate of generality, hence 
authorizing science’s quest for laws 
of nature without abandoning the 
possibility of a world that can sur-
prise inquiry. The second chap-
ter sets out to study the ways in 
which the early pragmatists influ-
enced one another (16), as against 
their “tendency” to polemical self-
identity. Peirce, writes Anderson, 
marked out a “middle-ground” 
between Royce and Dewey in 
respect of two key issues: the issue 
of method and the consequent 
assessment of his realism. Thus, 
Royce considers that reality is “a 
fixed, unified whole and the story 
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from a static and absolute view of 
reality is the operation of chance, 
evident in geology, in evolutionary 
biology, and in statistics—a field in 
which Peirce himself made a major 
contribution. likewise, experi-
mental science demonstrates the 
self- correcting nature of inquiry. 
We get things wrong, frequently 
and demonstrably, but we cannot 
conduct inquiry without believ-
ing that there is a right answer 
and, hence, without the means to 
detect error (and without a way of 
accounting for these means).
Peirce’s realism holds that there 
are real habits in nature; they are the 
way existents behave. Regularity is 
subject to the operations of chance 
and to the infinite variability of sim-
ilars. As Dewey puts it in Experience 
and Nature (1925), “Unless nature 
had regular habits, persistent ways, 
so compacted that they time, mea-
sure, and give rhythm and recur-
rence to transitive flux, meanings, 
recognizable characters, could  not 
be” (65). It also holds that the 
nature of reality is relational and 
continuous. In  chapter 6, Anderson 
discusses the proposition that this 
dimension is not just posited theo-
retically, but that it enters into expe-
rience through perception. This is 
a position identified with William 
James and given the name “radi-
cal empiricism.” The chapter is 
devoted to investigating the points 
of agreement between Peirce and 
James in this matter. While Peirce 
insisted that mind is continuous, 
Margolis’s assessment of Peirce 
(chapter 3), as well as in the radical 
pragmatism of Rorty. As we dis-
cover in chapter 4, the importance 
of conversation can be overstated. 
For Rorty, “philosophy is conver-
sation that constructs stories about 
the way things are” (68). But Peirce 
would view Rorty as a nominalist 
for whom no general is real. Now 
the problem for Peirce in nominal-
ism is that it recognizes as reality 
only an inchoate bunch of singular 
facts. But if “there are no real laws 
or generals in the cosmos, then 
there can be no heading toward 
truth even as an ideal or regula-
tive hope” (106); scientific prac-
tice would be self-contradictory, 
unable to give a coherent account 
of itself. Peirce cannot tolerate any 
practice of philosophy that takes no 
account of the practice of science; 
indeed, he considered the advances 
of nineteenth-century science to be 
central to a principled reworking of 
metaphysics and epistemology. The 
question we are asking when we 
ask what is real and how we know 
it changes as a result. Induction is 
promoted above deduction in the 
actual conduct of scientific inves-
tigation, with the result that truth 
is modalized—probabilistic rather 
than absolute. The theory of evo-
lution demonstrates the need to 
take into account the ever-chang-
ing dynamism of nature and to 
abandon the static views charac-
teristic of both nominalism and 
Platonism. Significant in this shift 
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manipulation—by instruments, let 
us say rain gauges, weathercocks, 
or microscopes (these are common 
examples adduced by Peirce)—
mediates the rawness of the world, 
making it available for chemical 
and physical investigation, and 
for the sophisticated techniques of 
measuring and counting in which 
Peirce himself was a specialist. 
What we see when we measure the 
curvature of the earth’s surface by 
using the specialized instruments 
developed by Peirce the “pendulum 
swinger” is quite different from 
what we see with the naked eye. 
The issue of perception changes as 
a result of taking such things into 
account in our reading of Peirce, 
but how he himself would have 
articulated discussions of natural 
perception with his understanding 
of mediated observation remains 
a matter of conjecture. I believe 
he took it for granted pervasively, 
because he takes instruments to be 
signs on the grounds that (a) they 
mediate perception and (b) they 
make material available to inter-
pretation in a form in which it can 
be processed. Anderson does not 
engage in such conjecture, prefer-
ring to remain within the terms 
Peirce sets. By 1903 when he deliv-
ered the Harvard lectures that are 
the subject of chapter 6,3 Peirce had 
given up his scientific work and 
was addressing himself exclusively 
to his philosophical colleagues. He 
used these lectures to set out a sys-
tematic first philosophy that could 
not contained discretely in indi-
vidual brains, it is also important 
for him to argue that individual 
experience is a driver of collective 
inquiry, for, without this, “mere” 
conversation would take over the 
process. However, this entails a 
modification of the tenets of empir-
icism. The modification turns on 
two principal points: First, percep-
tion for Peirce is not a series of dis-
crete events; it is a process whereby 
the percept accedes to judgment 
and thus to inquiry, all stages of 
this process being fallible, subject 
to testing and correction.2 Second, 
that which we perceive cannot be 
confined to “particular or singular 
entities or qualia” (103); we must 
be able to perceive relations and 
continuity. laws must be  features 
of human experience as such: 
“[U]nder Peirce’s version of per-
ception, the reality of generals and 
of laws makes an appearance not 
only at the end of inquiry but in 
the very perceptions from which 
inquiry springs” (108). Only on 
some such basis can Peirce make 
sense of “the possibility and the 
importance of a history of inquiry 
that is capable of development and 
self- correction” (108).
It is not only the findings of 
scientific research that affect the 
work of philosophy;  importantly 
for Peirce, it is its technical 
methods. In experimental sci-
ence, we do not deal with raw 
sense impressions, but with data 
manipulated for observation. This 
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under the category of secondness, 
“which is dyadic, precognitive and 
therefore pre-interpreted” (121). 
(ii) How then does “secondness” 
become “thirdness”; how does it 
enter into semeiosis? The question 
is summed up in (iii): How do per-
cepts initiate interpretation (125)? 
He suggests an answer in Peirce’s 
distinction between “antecipuum” 
and “ponecipuum,” which are 
ways of naming stages of a process 
rather than distinct classes. This 
process is Housman’s answer: it 
“nudge[s] interpretation from the 
external side” of semeiosis (128, my 
emphasis); and again “the Peircean 
ideas of dynamic objects, percepts, 
immediate objects, and perceptual 
judgments provide a way to under-
stand the crucial place of both sides 
of the interpretation—the objective 
and the intersubjective” (131, my 
emphasis). The formulation seems 
to me somewhat unfortunate: 
while infinitesimally reduced, there 
is still a purported gap between the 
real and its representation. Hence 
nominalism persists.
Housman’s discussion of the 
issues raised in chapters 5 and 7 is 
fastidious, but not entirely satisfy-
ing for this reason. However, the 
issue is unresolved by Peirce him-
self. As Christopher Hookway 
writes, Peirce was “wrestling with 
issues of genuine difficulty” and 
was never entirely happy with his 
solutions. He suggests that Peirce 
introduces the term “percipuum,” 
which “fus[es] the percept and the 
integrate into Pragmatism both the 
formal logic he had urged on Royce 
and the metaphysics he had urged 
on Dewey. In them, too, he urged 
the importance of a “truly scien-
tific philosophy” and developed an 
account of perception that speaks 
directly to that of James, on the 
one hand inflecting his speculative 
phenomenology through an appeal 
to empiricism and, on the other, 
revising empiricism in line with his 
realism.
I believe that the restatement 
of the issue of perception as scien-
tific observation suggests a solu-
tion to the problem discussed by 
Housman in chapter 7: “[A]t what 
stage does the pre-interpreted 
begin to be interpreted, and how 
does the pre-interpreted func-
tion” to constrain interpretation 
(120)? In this chapter, the question 
is the articulation of the “imme-
diate object” with the “dynamic 
object,” where the immediate object 
is the object as interpreted, and the 
dynamic object is that which initi-
ates, exceeds, and at the same time 
constrains our interpretations. It 
is the condition on interpretation, 
which “does not vanish” with the 
sequence of immediate objects; 
“otherwise revision would not 
occur” (119). Housman restates his 
question in several forms: the ver-
sion just quoted counts as (i). I con-
strue (ii) on the following premises: 
if, as Peirce insists, an encoun-
ter with “something” is “forced 
upon” us, then this encounter falls 
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that it survives) is not an  experience 
in the useful sense, whereas the 
dogs’ hearing of the doorbell is.6 
Housman’s discussion of the tem-
porality of perception has much in 
common with Hookway’s, despite 
the contrast discerned between 
them by Rosenthal.7 Hookway’s, 
however, avoids the trap of hunt-
ing down the “pre-interpreted,” as 
indeed does Rosenthal’s: “[W]hat 
is ‘given’ at the most fundamental 
level of perceptual awareness is in 
fact a ‘taken’, and it incorporates 
both the nature of the taking and 
the nature of what is taken.”8
Brute reality is that up against 
which we bump in the surprises 
of experience for which the pres-
ent state of our knowledge cannot 
prepare us. These bumping expe-
riences are indeed, as Housman 
writes, instances of secondness. But 
Peirce does not ask how second-
ness becomes thirdness (question 
(ii)); he asks how thirdness provides 
the means for designating second-
ness. These means are indexical, 
and they are always already signs. 
This does not deny the existence of 
brute reality; it merely claims that 
only under experience does brute 
reality also partake of signhood. If 
it is an object, it is object-of-a-sign, 
whether this sign be a percept or 
something more—or indeed less—
articulate. Hookway points out that 
objects are necessarily intentional 
objects, and that, in Peirce’s work, 
perception is centrally the issue of 
reference.9 Questions (i)  and (iii), 
perceptual judgment into a single 
whole,” as an attempt to prevent 
the consequences of “an oversimple 
dichotomy” between the “pouring 
in” of sense data and the concep-
tual processing of those data.4 The 
given of perceptual experience is a 
“phenomenologically rich complex 
of the sensory and the conceptual.” 
The term experience is important 
here. As we see in Dewey, experi-
ence is neither inside nor outside, 
and in Sandra Rosenthal’s formula-
tion “the perceptual field, as it arises 
in the context of human activity, is 
an ontologically thick, resisting 
field of objects which are essentially 
related to the interactional hori-
zon of our world and which allow 
for the very structure of the sensing 
which gives access to them.”5 Note 
“human” and “our.” Experience 
is species-specific because percep-
tion is species-specific: my dogs do 
not experience the ring on the tele-
phone, but they do experience the 
ring at the front door and respond 
as to a sign, with habitual behav-
ior. Or to contrary effect, we might 
adduce the example of a bird that 
attempts to fly into the reflection of 
a tree in a pane of glass—an out-
ward clash indeed, with no aspect 
that can be processed semeiotically 
by the bird, and hence nothing from 
which it can learn. As Hookway 
writes, “[A]ny length of experi-
ence, no matter how short, will 
contain elements of memory and 
anticipation”; the bird’s clash with 
the pane of glass (even supposing 
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dichotomy determines the ideal–
real dilemma and hence the fantasy 
of perfect truth, knowledge that 
allegedly mirrors nature. I have 
discerned this metaphor in vestigial 
form in Housman’s chapter 7, and I 
also discern it in his chapter 5: Did 
Peirce, he asks, “have a vision of a 
reality that functions as an extra-
mental condition not exhausted 
by the interpretants that render it 
intelligible?” (80, my emphasis). 
The inexhaustible condition of 
all thought in general is “external-
ity” (98, my emphasis). I point this 
out not to rebuke Housman, but 
to note how persistent the stan-
dard language of philosophy is in 
the face of attempts to change it. 
Peirce’s attempt to change it lies in 
his reworking of the dilemmas of 
knowledge in terms of time. This 
is clear in Peirce’s choice of vocabu-
lary in his account of the two objects 
of semeiosis: they are immediate 
and dynamic, the former registered 
in one sign event whose interpreta-
tion is provisional, already inciting 
the next, the latter mobile, its ontol-
ogy, we might say, that of cosmic 
time. Housman does a formidable 
job in teasing out this issue, argu-
ing persuasively as he does so that 
Peirce’s is a “process philosophy”: 
“what is knowable as reality is tem-
porally spread as or in sequences of 
events” (77).
We do not need to ask what is 
purportedly internal and external 
to the mind, or to thought, and 
indeed our authors avoid the trap 
I  suggest, are answered by adduc-
ing the transformation of natural 
perception into scientific obser-
vation. A surprising event, an 
unexpected appearance—think of 
Alexander Fleming and the discov-
ery of the unknown bacterium that 
was to become penicillin—incites 
examination with instruments and 
chemical techniques. No doubt this 
process displays parallels with the 
process of interpreting a spot on 
the horizon, the example adduced 
by Housman, but the scientific and 
technical examples are illuminat-
ing in two particular respects: (i) 
Fleming’s microscope and the fur-
ther techniques he used for exam-
ining the properties of penicillium 
are signs devised for the purposes 
of inquiry; and (ii) if we take as par-
adigmatic the scientific examples, 
rather than the natural ones, then 
they bring to our attention the fact 
that natural, unaided perception is 
not for all that naïve or untutored. 
A “brief process of education” is all 
that is needed.10 We at least ask a 
question: What is this? We know 
that we do not know.
The spatial metaphor that 
underpins much of empiricism 
and beyond that tradition, the mil-
lennial debates in metaphysics, 
determines a form of the issue that 
Peirce tried tirelessly to dismantle, 
though the traditional language of 
philosophy sometimes betrays him: 
How do the things outside our cra-
nium come to form the contents 
of our minds? The inside–outside 
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difficulties involved in this position, 
see Christopher Hookway, Peirce, 
Arguments of the Philosophers, ed. 
Ted Honderich (london: Routledge, 
1985), chap. 5. Sandra Rosenthal’s 
solution is to construe “infallible” 
in such contexts as meaning that “it 
does not profess anything” (“Peirce’s 
Pragmatic Account of Perception,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Peirce: 
Issues and Complications, ed. Cheryl 
Misak, Cambridge Companions to 
Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004], 193–213, quota-
tion on 198).
3. These are available in the Collected 
Papers (1932) as well as in The Essential 
Peirce (1998), but can also be consulted 
in a stand-alone edition: Pragmatism 
as a Principle and Method of Right 
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on 
Pragmatism by Charles Sanders Peirce, 
ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997).
4. Hookway, Peirce, 166.
5. Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic 
Account,” 211 (my emphasis).
6. Hookway, Peirce, 165.
7. Ibid., 194. Rosenthal is referring to an 
earlier discussion by Housman than 
the one contained in the book under 
review.
8. Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic 
Account,” 201.
9. Hookway, Peirce, 157.
10. Peirce, quoted in ibid., 163.
11. “Conversation” is only a subset of 
semeiosis for Peirce. On this point, 
I refer to my debate with Jürgen 
Habermas: Anne Freadman, The 
Machinery of Talk: Charles Peirce and 
the Sign Hypothesis, Cultural Memory 
in the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 216–22.
laid by the metaphor in their usage 
in chapter 3, asking instead what is 
outside the human and outside its 
constructs. If there are two dimen-
sions to reality, as Peirce insists, 
they are governed by—or stretched 
between—human and cosmic 
time, our knowledge of the object 
being limited by and to the former 
(whether the micro time of percep-
tion or the macro time of history), 
but always set against the latter, 
which is, in Housman’s felicitous 
phrase, “the infinite escape from 
closure on the part of interpreta-
tion” (99). The consequence of not 
grasping this is the “degeneration 
of pragmatism,” those versions of 
pragmatism that confine them-
selves to human affairs.11 Any such 
confinement might well conclude 
that conversation is all there is.
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NOTES
1. Manley Thompson, The Pragmatic 
Philosophy of C. S. Peirce (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953).
2. Peirce sometimes states that the percept 
is infallible. For a discussion of the 
